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Director of Central Intelligence		_	TUD SCICE	

## **National Intelligence Daily**

Saturday 16 August 1980

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16 August 1980

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SITUATION REPORT		
IRAN		25 <b>X</b> 1
Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh yesterday tolin Tehran that in the next day or two he would worded letter" to the Islamic Assembly advocation of the US hostage issue.	d send a "strongly	
Ghotzbadeh said he was well aware fundamentalists would oppose him, but line would, nevertheless, "attract con port." He said immediate action was not it is "almost at war" with the USSR had "ample evidence" that the USSR "th porters" is involved in "dangerous mediates."	that he hoped his siderable local supecessary because and noted that he rough its local supedling" in Iran.	
mbo Donai w Minister who has son		25 <b>X</b> I
The Foreign Minister, who has con of the strongest anti-Soviet critics is give up his position in the government the Assembly and his anti-Soviet states week may be intended to try to convinct foremost threat to the Islamic revolut USSR.	n Iran, will soon . The letter to ment earlier this e Iranians that the	25X
		25X
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According to press reports, about tors marched outside the British Embas were ordered to stay away from the gatezers.	sy yesterday, but	
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The Thatcher government, noting that similar threats have been made before, decided yesterday not to give in to Iranian pressure. The case against the militants will proceed normally through the courts.

London recognizes that the situation is more serious than in the past, although relations between Britain and Iran have been poor since the US hostages were taken. Tension has mounted since Prime Minister Thatcher eulogized the Shah, and relations will continue to deteriorate. The British Embassy in Tehran--reduced to a skeleton crew for several months--will not be open today and plans to withdraw the remaining staff will be considered during the next few days.


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BRIEFS AND COMMENTS		
POLAND: Labor Unrest		25X1
Spreading labor unrest in and around the Bal of Gdansk may soon confront the regime with its mo cal challenge since strikes almost paralyzed Lubli	st serious polit <u>i</u>	25X1 -
A strike by 17,000 workers in the Ler mains unsettled and apparently has caused in two other large shipyards and several stries. Local transportation workers in Gda neighboring cities also have gone on strik rumors that there will be a general strike Monday.	sympathy strik smaller facto- ansk and two ke. There are	
Workers in the Lenin shipyards—among paid in Poland—have refused to return to management's willingness to meet most of tincluding a 12-percent pay increase. The have locked themselves in the shipyard and gotiating with management, reportedly also against reprisals, a reduction in meat priof their grievances, and a meeting with Propress demands for a free trade union.	work despite their demands, workers, who have been neset guarante tes, publicati	ly es on
The local militia apparently have been have cordoned off areas around the shipyar been held back from direct contact with the Given the violent riots that occurred in any contact between workers and militia conserious violence even though the militia parmed. Violence in Gdansk might lead to parts of the country.	rds, but have ne strikers. Gdansk in 1970, buld lead to probably are no	25X1 t
The regime has thus far continued the approach that has carried it through six wand work slowdowns. Articles and commentatral media yesterday appealed to patriotis restraint to get workers in Gdansk back or Although such appeals have been effective they may have lost some of their impact du longed period of labor unrest.	weeks of strike ary in the cen- sm and self- n the job. in the past,	
If the workers in Gdansk refuse to be their politically unacceptable demands for union, the leadership will be under pressu	r a free trade	25 <b>X</b> 1
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tougher stance. During his just ended Crimean vacation, Gierek may have been counseled by the Soviets to become more aggressive.

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Babiuch, in a speech to the nation yesterday, injected a note of toughness into Warsaw's conciliatory line. He warned the workers that they must return to work and that their actions are being exploited by "enemies" of Communist Poland. Babiuch also said that the meat price increases in July will not be rescinded and that meat supplies will not improve. He promised, however, that meat prices will remain frozen until the fall of 1981.

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	USSR-US: Reactions to Presidential Directive	
	Soviet propagandists have moved quickly to integrate Presidential Directive 59 into existing anti-US themes, striving in particular to raise doubts in Western Europe about US motives in deploying modernized long-range theater nuclear forces.	
	Under the familiar rubric of an alleged US drive to regain military primacy, Soviet commentators are characterizing the directive as a new strategy to achieve a 25X nuclear first-strike capability. Lev Semeyko, a veteran commentator on military affairs, extended this interpretation in the military journal Red Star by claiming that Washington is working toward a "first-strike potential" on the "European level" as well. The head of the Central Committee's International Information Department, speaking with West Germans in Moscow on the 10th anniversary of the Soviet - West German treaty last Tuesday, said that the directive "reveals why the US in reality sought deployment in Europe of cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles."	
	Pravda's senior political observer, Yuri Zhukov, reiterated this line on Wednesday and contrasted the "dangerous" US plan to ride out in safety a local nuclear war in Europe with Soviet proposals to negotiate "as soon as possible" on medium-range missiles in Europe in conjunction with US "forward-based nuclear means."	
	Some commentators, including Semeyko, have noted that the strategy embodied in the directive is not an abrupt departure from previous US doctrine, citing ante- 25% cedents from 1974 and earlier. The Soviets are resurrecting warnings they issued at that time to the effect that attempts to entertain the "illusory possibility" of limited nuclear wars "lowers the threshold of nuclear confrontation."	<b>(</b> 1
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PAKISTAN: Dispute Between Islamic Sects	
Differences between the two main Islamic se continue to fester, despite an agreement last mon dent Zia, who belongs to the Sunni majority, and Shia minority.	th between Presi-
Following a Shia demonstration on 5 imposing religious taxes in accord with S on Shias, Zia promised that the rules of would not be imposed on another. Many Su of Zia for giving in to the Shias and are prospect of paying taxes from which Shias One Sunni extremist organization demands prayers and processions.	unni theology one Islamic sect nnis are critical angered by the will be exempt.
The Shias believe that the money, whused for charity, will go primarily to Suthat Zia's ultimate goal is to turn Pakis state.	ich is to be nnis. They fear
Pakistan's most important Muslim all Arabia and Shia Iranalso could become i dispute. The Saudis so far do not appear the dispute with Islamabad, but members of family contributed \$200 million to start funds the taxes are to support.	nvolved in the to have raised f the Saudi royal
The recent increase in Iranian support Pakistani Shias reflects the growing polithe clerical leadership in Tehran. The I has kept up its attacks on Zia, and there demonstration at the Pakistani Embassy on	tical role of ranian press was another 25X1
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BRAZIL: Right-Wing Violence		
A recent surge of right-wing extremist activity aimed at dis- rupting liberalization could, if sustained, cause political problems for the government.		
The attacks began last month when a prominent human rights activist was beaten during the visit of Pope John Paul II. Since then, sporadic shootings and bombings have been directed at leftist politicians and labor leaders, and newsstands selling leftist publications have been burned.	25X1	
Several ultraconservative organizations claim responsibility for most of the violence. They oppose the government's policy of gradual political liberalization and the left's increasing visibility. They may hope either to intimidate the left or to provoke it into more open agitation which would invite a tougher government response.		25X1
The Justice Minister publicly repudiates the violence and maintains that the attacks will not affect liberalization. His assertions have been met with skepticism, however, because no arrests have yet been made and because local authorities are not pursuing the investigations vigorously.		25X1
Many Brazilians believe the lack of results stems from the fact that members of Army security forces are		
among the culprits.		25X1 25X1
The government's failure to act is damaging its already delicate credibility in this case. If the attacks continue, there would be a greater likelihood that leftist groups may turn to violence themselves.		25X1
Chat Itelist Gloups may turn to violence themserves.		25X
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ISLAMIC STATES: Jerusalem Conference

Members of the Islamic Conference Jerusalem Committee meet today in Morocco in a special session called to discuss strategy for countering Israel's recent action reaffirming its claim to sovereignty over all of Jerusalem. Moderates led by Saudi Arabia and Morocco will probably push for approval of the recent Iraqi-Saudi call for sanctions against those countries maintaining embassies in Jerusalem or endorsing the Israeli move. Saudi Crown Prince Fahd's highly publicized comments earlier this week contain an implied warning that Saudi patience with the US is wearing thin on this issue.

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INTERNATIONAL: Oil Consumption	•	
Oil consumption in the seven major is countries continued to decline in the section this year as higher prices, fuel substitute economic slowdown cut oil usage roughly 5 the same period in 1979. Italy was the or country where continued strong economic accountry where continued strong economic accountry where the lead push oil sales above level. Light and heavy fuel oil demand din most countries, but only the US and Jay declines in gasoline usage.	ond quarter of tion, and the percent from nly individual ctivity in the e last year's ropped sharply	25X1

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS	25X1
USSR: Status of the Economy	
The Soviet economy has made a poor showing during the first half of the year. Although prospects are good for a better-than-average grain crop, a below-average harvest of most other major crops and declining meat output will prevent any rebound in agriculture this year. With continued slow growth also anticipated in industrial output, the energy situation deteriorating, and bottle-necks in transportation and construction continuing, GNP will likely grow less than 3 percent in 1980.	25X1
As of early this month, we estimate a Soviet grain crop in 1980 of about 210 million tons—a marked recovery from the 179 million—ton crop of last year. Despite the favorable prospects for grain, Soviet farm production probably will decline somewhat this year.	25X1
Production of meat and dairy products is being held back by inadequate quantity and quality of livestock feed, the legacy of poor harvests last year. The outlook for meat production is particularly gloomy. Based on our estimate of a 1980 grain harvest, total meat output for 1980 will drop about 2 to 3 percent from 1979 production to 15-15.2 million tons, the same level as in 1975.	25X1
Even with an above-average grain harvest, the Soviet need for grain imports will remain high. The US embargo has stretched domestic feed supplies to the limit, and the late spring reduced access to early pastures and slowed development of forage crops. If the USSR makes no more than marginal cuts in current livestock herds and postpones rebuilding depleted grain stocks, about 240 million tons of grain will be needed to meet total domestic requirements.	- 25X
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Industry Still Lagging	
Industrial production was nearly 4 percent higher 25X1 in the first half of 1980 than in the first half last year. Gains this year in a number of industrial sectors, however, barely recouped actual drops in output last year.	
In addition, lower than expected output of steel, coal, and cement will limit growth in the months ahead. For the year, we expect civilian industrial output to increase only about 3 percentslightly better than the post-war low of 1.8 percent recorded last year.	25X1
Energy Problems	
The Soviet energy situation continues to deteriorate. Energy production during the first six months of 1980 rose 3 percent above that in the corresponding period in 1979far short of the planned 4.4 percent increase for 1980. Fuel allocations to a number of industrial enterprises have been reduced in recent months, and spot shortages continue to be reported.	25X1
During the first half of this year, Soviet oil production averaged about 11.9 million barrels per day. This was 3.5 percent more than first half 1979, but less than a 1 percent increase over second half 1979.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Coal output for the first half of 1980 was down 1 percent from the corresponding period of 1979. For the year, coal production is unlikely to exceed 725 million tons20 million tons short of the current target.	25X1
Gas remains the one bright spot in the energy picture. Even though gas production in the first six months of this year was slightly behind plans, the target of 15.4 trillion cubic feet probably will be met as gas demand and production pick up in the fourth quarter.	25X
The failure of the energy sector to meet its goals apparently has caused Moscow to increase conservation	
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Top Secret 25X1 efforts. In the annual resolution by the Council of Ministers on stockpiling supplies of winter fuel, specific targets for energy conservation were included for the first time. The specific goals for conservation this year may be an indirect effort to ration the available energy supplies. 25X1 Consumer Blues The outlook for the Soviet consumer in 1980 is particularly gloomy. The 2 to 3 percent drop in Soviet meat production this year will depress per capita meat production to the level of the early 1970s. Shortages of livestock feed have led to reductions in supplies of butter and milk. 25X1 Soviet consumers 25X1 are obsessed with the food situation. The recent strikes at the Togliatti and Gorkiy motor vehicle plants involved longstanding discontent over work-related issues, but apparently were touched off by food shortages. The protests were settled quickly when the authorities brought in fresh food and other supplies. 25X1 Moscow's Reactions Recent Soviet press reports have stated that the comparatively low rate of industrial growth achieved was to be expected given the mature state of the economy. The leadership is aware, however, that the economy will have trouble recovering in the second half of the year. 25X1 Moreover, speeches by Soviet leaders in recent months--while containing traditional exhortations for increased production -- have placed much greater emphasis on the need for conservation. Besides the recent resolution on energy conservation, the Council of Ministers decreed in May that less metal should be used in indus-Although couched in terms of efficiency, the emphasis on conservation reflects Moscow's failed hopes for large gains in energy and raw materials production in the 25X1 short term.

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